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DECADES OF

PROCEDURAL REFORM HAVE FAILED TO
REDUCE CLAIMANTS' EXPENSES
Jeffrey M. Davidson*
In twenty years of asbestos litigation,proceduralreforms at all levels of the civil
litigation system have failed to reduce plaintiffs' attorneys'fees. The result has been
dramatic undercompensation of asbestos tort victims. This paper attepts to explain
this remarkablefact using economic methodology. The paper offers three theories:
First, that the continuing difficulty of assessing causation in asbestos and other mass
tort cases predictably impedes the efforts of procedural reform to reduce costs; second, that changes in defendant and insurer risk attitudes have generatedcostly litigation; third, that collusion of plaintiffs' attorneys to maintain prices cannot be ruled
out. Each of these theories has some empirical support. Further, regardless of
which turns out to be correct, the continuing high costs of civil litigation mean that
resolution of asbestos claims through the bankruptcy system will predictably harm
future claimants, an unfair outcome. In the final assessment, civil procedure reform,
the favored mechanism for resolving the asbestos case backlog, cannot achieve its
objectives. Rather, reform must take into account substantive law and the motives
and incentives of actors in the legal system. Holistic analysis of this type lends support to a comprehensive administrative remedies scheme, which has the best chance
of decreasing the costs of compensation.
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INTRODUCTION

In response to the asbestos crisis in America's civil litigation system,'
courts at all levels have reinvented civil procedure and substantive tort doctrine.
The goal was to reduce both private and public costs of resolving asbestos
claims. By now, it is possible to collectively label these efforts failures. The
civil justice system never did decrease the costs of resolving asbestos claims.
Rather, the task was left to the bankruptcy system, which appears to have
reduced costs substantially. Increasingly, pre-packaged bankruptcy petitions,
submitted already approved by the asbestos defendants and their tort claimants,
announce mass settlements of all claims, present and future.2 What incapacitated the civil justice system from adapting to the crisis? Why are plaintiffs'
costs of recovery for asbestos torts the same now as they were in 1985?V
Over the past two decades, courts have adopted inventive means to try to
reduce claimants' expenses. Aggregation techniques - among them mass consolidation, class actions, multi-district litigation, pleurel registries, standardized
pretrial orders, and collateral estoppel - have all been attempted or applied to
resolve the mass of asbestos claims. Despite all the judicial creativity, a thorough survey of litigation costs, using confidential information, finds that plaintiffs' fees have not declined at all since the onset of the asbestos litigation
phenomenon.4 This observation suggests that something is amiss in how we
think about efficiency in litigation - I argue that the theory of the procedural
reforms was misguided, and that practical barriers unique to the asbestos context thwarted what chance of success there was. By analyzing the asbestos
procedural reforms, this Article attempts to clarify some of the tradeoffs and
possibilities in civil justice reform.
This Article offers three possible answers to the mystery of static plaintiffs' costs. First, substantive tort doctrine created substantive bottlenecks that
prevented efficient settlement of claims. 5 Because the procedural reforms
could not, or at least did not, address the key substantive issues in asbestos
lawsuits - causation and exposure - the reforms could not reduce claimants'
expenses in any significant way. Second, risk-loving defendants and insurers
generated far more litigation than they would have if they had been risk neutral.6 Because a large percentage of asbestos defendants were insolvent and
I The Supreme Court described colorfully modem asbestos litigation as an "elephantine
mass." Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). That description was charitable, for an elephantine mass can eventually diminish in size. An unending deluge, to me,
seems more apt.
2 Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1754
(2002) ("Bankruptcy is the only generally recognized legal vehicle that is currently available
for imposing finality on a defendant's asbestos liability. Perhaps because of this, there have
been more asbestos-related bankruptcy filings since 2000 than in either of the two prior
decades.").
3 STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 103 (RAND, Institute for Civil Justice
2005). See also infra Section I.
4 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 103.
5 See infra Section II.
6 See infra Section III.
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therefore willing to take excess risks,7 and because their insurers, who normally
would have checked them, were at their policy limits, and therefore were also
willing to take excess risks, asbestos defendants extended litigation and drove
up costs. The results of defense-side risk-seeking are more litigation, slower
settlements, and higher costs for plaintiffs to recover. Third, plaintiffs' attorneys may
have colluded to maintain high prices even in the face of falling
8
costs.

This Article proceeds as follows. Section I outlines the problem of stable
plaintiffs' costs in the face of numerous procedural reforms designed to combat
those costs. Sections II, III, and IV then discuss the three theories for why
those costs have not fallen.
Section V closes, arguing that the persistent failure of procedural reform
proves that prepackaged bankruptcies, sometimes seen as the solution to the

asbestos problem, are certain to be highly inequitable. The inability of the civil
justice system to solve the asbestos crisis inspired creative lawyers to use the
bankruptcy system to resolve asbestos claims wholesale. 9 That the bankruptcy
system has succeeded against the backdrop of high civil litigation costs reveals

something about the bankruptcy system, with troubling implications. Specifically, the bankruptcy system must have offered plaintiffs' attorneys, the principals in asbestos litigation,' ° at least as much as they could have received from
the civil justice system. Because the bankruptcy trusts cap attorneys' fees at a
lower percentage than they could obtain in civil litigation," the plaintiffs'
attorneys could only have achieved the same wealth by transferring dollars

from future claims to present ones. This reveals a tremendous inequity in the
way pre-packaged bankruptcies treat the futures problem.

I.

THE PROBLEM

The RAND study of the asbestos problem examined confidential information in the hands of defendants to determine the amount of money allocated to
plaintiffs' attorneys in an asbestos action.1 2 In the twenty years from 1982 to
2002,
[n]one of the people we interviewed said they had seen any evidence that claimants'
attorney contingent fee rates had been reduced to reflect changes in the litigation.
Plaintiff attorneys may have recognized savings from routinization of the litigation
(e.g., the widespread use of administrative payment schedules). However, none of
7 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 109 (identifying seventy-three asbestos-related bankruptcies, with firms going bankrupt at an increasing rate).
I See infra Section IV.
9 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 119-21.
10 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1373-78 (1995); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology,
Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L. REV. 77, 82
(1997) ("[A]lthough litigants, not lawyers, must ultimately decide whether to accept a settlement offer or to demand adjudication, our experiments provide some illustrative support for
the belief that lawyers have the ability - at least under some circumstances - to persuade
litigants to approach the settlement-versus-trial decision from the lawyer's preferred analytical perspective.").
I1 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 128.
12 Id. at 4.
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those we interviewed suggested that any of these savings have been passed on to
claimants. Similarly, the people we interviewed generally13 said that they had not
observed any reduction in claimants' other legal expenses.

The number stayed constant at approximately 34% of gross compensation,
defined as the amount paid out to the plaintiff net of defense costs. 14 The
importance of this finding cannot be overstated. In a system designed over the
course of decades to reduce transactions costs, plaintiffs' transactions costs
remained exactly the same. Charles Silver has pointed out that the low net
compensation for asbestos claims, relative to, say, auto injury claims, need not
indicate anything wrong with the system. 5 Rather, asbestos cases could be
more complex than other tort cases, or more effective at weeding out false
claims (albeit at high cost). 16 But though these factors might explain an initially high level of plaintiffs' transactions costs, they do not explain the complete stasis of those costs over time. Procedural reform was supposed to reduce
those costs, and certainly two decades should have been enough time for the
positive effects of those reforms to be felt.
Defense transactions costs, by contrast, decreased dramatically, from a
high of 59% of gross compensation in 1986 to 20% in 2001, the last year of the
study. 7 Any explanation for the stable costs to plaintiffs must also account for
the decrease in costs to defendants. RAND offers one explanation - a decrease
in collateral litigation among defendants and insurers. 18 This is plausible, since
defendants in the early days had to pursue multiple lawsuits to resolve one
claim as a result of contribution actions against other defendants and coverage
litigation against insurers. 9 However, once principles of allocation and indemnity were settled, the need for this litigation disappeared.2 ° Manufacturing
defendants and their insurers have now reached standard allocation agreements
amongst themselves, where a given claim is allocated among liable parties on a
percentage basis. 2 ' This obviates the need for costly collateral litigation.
Plaintiffs do not need such agreements, because principles of joint and several
liability decrease the need to recover from more than one defendant. Since it is
difficult to determine whether the procedural reforms or the end of most collateral litigation was responsible for the decline in defense transactions costs, this
Article analyzes the two independently.
The Manville Trust, the model on which most bankruptcy asbestos trusts
are based, contrasts starkly with the failed civil litigation system.2 2 The
Manville Trust caps plaintiffs' lawyers' fees at 25% of the payout.2 3 Other
13

Id. at 103.

14 Id. at 102.
1 Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2079 (2002).
16 Id.
17 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 96.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.

22 Id. at 110-11.

23 Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Mass Tort Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833, 842
n.28 (2005).
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bankruptcy trusts appear to impose similar caps. 24 As a result, the costs to the
plaintiff of pursuing a claim against a bankruptcy trust are much lower than the
costs of pursuing the same claim through civil litigation. 25 Defense costs under
this process drop precipitously, while plaintiffs' costs drop, though less. 26 The
key feature of the Manville Trust is an accelerated claims-handling procedure.
Plaintiffs are required to file sufficient information to place them in a metaphorical grid that contains seven categories, relating to the amount of provable
exposure and the severity of their symptoms. 2 7 The system is not adversarial in
the same fashion as the civil justice system, because elements such as causation
that would be contested in court are not necessary to claim against the trust. As
a result, defense costs declined even farther than plaintiffs' costs, to five percent of total payouts, according to RAND. 28 The Manville Trust provides a
helpful data point. Something about the procedural reform implemented there
proved superior (at least as to cost) to the civil litigation system. As I will
explain, the Manville Trust mechanism succeeds because it dispenses with
extensive proof of causation and exposure, two costs that the asbestos litigation
system has so far failed to reduce.
As plaintiffs' costs remained the same, courts were showing unprecedented procedural dynamism in an attempt to rapidly move asbestos claims
through the system. The innovations were both procedural and substantive.
The procedural reforms largely entail aggregation of asbestos claims by
one method or another. Aggregation is one of the hallmarks of modem civil
procedure, 29 and naturally these methods were applied to asbestos. Various
forms of aggregation were attempted; though some were rejected as unfair on
appeal, 3 ° some forms continue to be used. Aggregation works by compiling
similar issues from different cases and deciding them at once. As Sherman
pointed out, all of the various aggregation techniques share this feature. The
impetus for aggregation is the savings from "eliminating duplication and providing economies of scale.'
The most popular aggregation technique for asbestos cases in the state
courts is the consolidated trial.3 2 Dozens to hundreds to thousands of plaintiffs,
with claims of varying degrees of similarity, are joined into a mega-trial, which
is usually divided into several phases dealing with issues such as general causa24

Id.

25 CARROLL ET AL.,

supra note 3, at 97.

Id.
27 Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, Proof of Claim Form (2002), http://www.
mantrust.org/FrP/POC02.PDF [hereinafter Manville Claim Form].
26

28 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 97.

29 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281, 1291 (1976).
30 E.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999); Cimino v. Raymark Indus.,
Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319 (5th Cir. 1998).

31Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Dispositionof Related Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV.
LunG. 231, 237 (1991).
32 Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative
Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1868-70 (1992).
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tion, liability, and defenses. Settlement is the33usual outcome in these cases, as
in all large-scale aggregations of tort claims.
In the federal system, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered
federal asbestos cases to be consolidated for pretrial proceedings under the
multi-district litigation system ("MDL"). 34 Judge Weiner heard all pretrial
motions in connection with the consolidated cases.35 This task now resides
with Judge Giles in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 36 In the MDL process, cases pending in district courts across the country are consolidated in
front of a single transferee judge for pretrial proceedings, including discovery
and motions for summary adjudication. No comparable device exists on the
state level, though certain reformers have proposed that it should.3 7
Sampling for purposes of damages was attempted in Cimino.38 This
method attempted to avoid the need to individually determine each plaintiffs
damages. Rather, a statistical sample was taken of the plaintiffs in the case; the
damages suffered by the sample were extrapolated to estimate the damage for
the whole class. Each plaintiff then received the damages predicted by the
sampling technique, rather than her actual damages.
Litigants attempted class action settlements on two occasions; both
attempts were rejected by the Supreme Court. 3 9 Both Ortiz and Amchem found
that the class action mechanism did not adequately protect the rights of future
claimants: in Ortiz because the "common pool" theory under which the case
was brought allocated too small a pool to satisfy all the claimants; and in
Amchem because the future claimants were inadequately represented, and the
claims were too dissimilar. The rejection of the class action settlements in
those cases illustrates a fundamental feature of aggregation techniques, which
is that some amount of fairness, in all cases procedural fairness (as measured by
the process traditionally available) and in some cases substantive fairness, is
sacrificed in order to resolve the claims more economically.
Equally common are docketing reforms, such as the use of pleural registries or consolidated pretrials. Pleurel registries in particular have gained steam
as a way to prioritize the claims of the sickest plaintiffs.4 ° A pleurel registry is
a docketing maneuver used to deal with claimants who claim asbestos expo33 George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Torts Class Actions,

26 J. LEGAL

STUD.

521, 522 (1997).

28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
35 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422-424 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
36 Shannon P. Duffy, Companies Seek Dismissal of Thousands of Asbestos Cases, THE
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (2006), available at www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?
id= 1149843922549.
37 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS
AND ANALYSIS § 4.01 (1994).
31 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 664 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd 151 F.3d
297 (5th Cir. 1998).
" Ortiz, v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
40 See In re All Asbestos Litig. Filed in Madison County, Order Establishing Asbestos
Deferred Registry (Madison County Cir. Ct., Ill. Jan. 23, 2004).
34

Fall 2006]

ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS

sure, but who have not yet developed significant symptoms.4 1 Their claims are
docketed so that their claims will not become time-barred. However, litigation
does not advance until they develop actual symptoms.
Judges have attempted to use standardized procedures for handling individual asbestos cases, such as standard interrogatories, rules on service of process, and standing orders.42 The goal behind these reforms is the same as other
aggregation techniques: to create economies of scale by deciding issues once
for a large group of cases, rather than deciding the same issues for each individual case.
Other procedural tools, interestingly, have not been used - collateral
estoppel, even as to general defenses like the state-of-the-art defense, has been
denied.43 The state-of-the-art defense was one of the original eleven defenses
in the seminal Borel case, the first case to find asbestos manufacturers strictly
liable for failure to warn of the dangers of asbestos. 44 Manufacturers in that
case advanced the state-of-the-art defense, arguing that at the time of Borel's
exposure, scientific research had not yet demonstrated that asbestos caused cancer.45 Hence, the manufacturers argued against the imposition of strict liability
for failure to warn. Borel was a landmark case because the defense was
rejected, opening the floodgates to subsequent litigation. Despite the importance of Borel, the Fifth Circuit regarded the issues in asbestos cases, including
the viability of the state-of-the-art defense, as too dissimilar to one another to
constitute the "same issue" for the purposes of collateral estoppel.4 6 This is
part of a general trend that will become clear - despite the enormous number of
asbestos cases, procedural expediency, not substantive clarity, is the order of
the day. For instance, even though numerous cases have rejected manufacturers' state-of-the-art defense, it continues to be relitigated to this day.4 7 The
mechanisms for resolving asbestos cases en masse have not succeeded, precisely because they have not created sufficiently clear substantive guidelines
for when a claimant can collect.
The goal of procedural reform is to achieve economies of scale. It is
thought that by resolving common issues on a collective basis, litigants save
time and money. Courts also preserve judicial resources by considering common issues only once. As commonsense as this theory is, it must reckon with
the fact that plaintiffs' transaction costs declined not a whit in the wake of
41 The term "pleurel" refers to the pleurel lining of the lung, which is the target of most

asbestos related cancers. A spot on a lung x-ray usually is the catalyst for a new asbestos
claim, although such a spot does not necessarily predict future disease.
42 See Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, JudicialInnovation in Mass Tort Litigation,
33 TORT & INS. L.J. 127, 129 (1997).
" Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 345 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that the
variety in asbestos claimants' situations rendered the use of issue preclusion unfair).
4 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1081, 1091-1102 (5th Cir. 1973).
45 For a detailed discussion of the state-of-the-art defense, see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT:
46

THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL

42 (1985).

Hardy, 681 F.2d at 345.

47 Some manufacturers have offered to waive the state-of-the-art defense to avoid a punitive

damages instruction. This suggests an awareness that the defense is likely futile, but a willingness in general to litigate the defense. See Rice & Davis, supra note 42, at 131.
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wholesale procedural reform in the asbestos context.4 8 Either unexpected diseconomies of scale canceled out the gains, or the projected economies did not
materialize for the plaintiffs.
The next Sections will put forth and analyze three possible explanations
for the static transactions costs for plaintiffs with asbestos claims. As will
become clear, the theories often complement one another, and so should not be
viewed as competitors, but as different angles on the same problem. One claim
is that the courts' failure to clarify substantive law mooted procedural
reforms. 4 9 A second claim is that the insolvency of defendants, combined with
claims at the policy limits of their insurers, caused excessive risk taking, driving up costs of litigation.5 ° Since litigation costs are the opportunity costs of
settlement, high litigation costs increase attorneys' fees, even when cases are
ultimately settled. A third claim is that asbestos plaintiffs' attorneys have successfully combined to maintain high prices, even in the face of hypothetical
savings."
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly considering several simple but ultimately unsatisfying explanations for stable plaintiffs' costs. One such possibility is that the price of resolving an asbestos claim has remained the same
simply because nothing has happened to change the conditions that set that
price. In microeconomic equilibrium under conditions of perfect competition
and constant costs, prices remain the same.52 If those conditions are met, then
identical prices are to be expected, both among sellers and over time.5 3 One
difficult feature of antitrust enforcement is precisely this feature: benign forces
and malignant forces will have the same effect - uniform prices - only at different price levels.5 4 With no "true" price for comparison, the reality can be
elusive. The question becomes even more difficult when market conditions are
in flux, because combinations of shifts in supply and demand can produce stable price levels that are consistent with either cartel pricing or stable equilibrium.5 5 The asbestos litigation situation is clearly a case of shifting market
conditions. Equilibrium simply cannot be the answer here, for the civil justice
system has been in unprecedented flux at all court levels since the onset of the
asbestos phenomenon. If plaintiffs' lawyers face identical costs now as they
did in 1985, it could only be because equal forces pull in opposite directions,
and not because there are no forces at all. The only other alternative is a malicious attempt to maintain prices despite the changing market conditions.
Another simple answer would argue that defendants have achieved economies of scale over time, as they develop expertise dealing with asbestos claims.
supra note 3, at 103.
See infra Section II.
50 See infra Section III.
51 See infra Section IV.
52 JOHN B. TAYLOR, ECONoMics 65-68 (2d ed. 1998).
53 Id.
48 CARROLL ET AL.,

41

See infra Section III.
This is one of the fundamental theoretical difficulties in empirical economics. Models
with enough moving parts to be good explanations of the phenomenon under study can be
somewhat indeterminate when applied to a particular situation. The same problem applies
when those economic models are then applied to legal matters. For this reason, I have had to
content myself with three explanations of the stable costs phenomenon, instead of just one.
54
51
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Plaintiffs, since each is involved in only one claim (or a few, in jurisdictions
allowing later claims), do not have the chance to develop such expertise. They
are not repeat players, and therefore cannot reap the benefits of returns to scale.
This analysis would confirm the understanding underlying the procedural
reforms that have been undertaken. That understanding was that by doing
things once that would otherwise have to be done for each case, the system
would save money and quickly resolve cases. The argument just presented
extends the economies of scale argument from the judicial system as a whole
and attributes economies of scale to the defense, but not the plaintiffs' side.
If true, differing litigant economies of scale would produce the result of
declining defense costs and stable plaintiffs' costs. However, this argument
misunderstands the nature of modern asbestos litigation. Asbestos plaintiffs'
lawyers are repeat players on a massive scale. 56 The status of an asbestos
plaintiffs' lawyer is judged by his "inventory," the number of claimants he has
under contract. 57 Lawyers have created mechanisms for mass screenings of
claims.58 The same legal arguments are used again and again. Indeed, while
the number of asbestos defendants has ballooned to some 8400 or more in
recent years,59 the size of the asbestos plaintiffs' bar remains startlingly
small.6" Whatever economies there might be should certainly appear as much
on the plaintiff side as the defendant side. The equal sophistication of the parties to the average asbestos lawsuit forces us to look for different explanations
for why plaintiffs, but not defendants, have such high costs.
A.

Method - the Importance of Settlement

To understand the asbestos litigation phenomenon, one must understand
settlement. It is surprising, then, that so many commentators have instead
focused on the relatively tiny number of cases that go to trial. As has been
pointed out before,61 many procedural reforms have a nominal purpose of
streamlining litigation, but have the latent purpose of encouraging settlement.
A mass trial, for instance, should not be seen as a way to resolve the dispute
(since an actual trial most likely will never happen), but as a feature of the
landscape in which settlement talks occur.
Since the majority of asbestos cases settle, 62 and the costs of settlement
should be comparable from one case to another, the decision to litigate rather
than settle is a primary driver of the overall costs of the system. 63 That is, for
64
In
purposes of analysis, the costs of settlement can be regarded as negligible.
See CARROLL ET
" See id. at 129.
58 Id. at 47.

56

AL.,

59 Id. at xxv.
60 See infra Section IV.
61 See generally George

supra note 3, at 23-24.

L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga-

tion, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
62 See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 10, at 77, 83 (discussing high rate of settlement and
possible difference between lawyer and litigant attitudes).
63 See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 527, 557-58 (1989).
6 Small settlement transactions costs are a fair assumption with regard to asbestos cases,
while they might not be in others. Partially because both the plaintiffs' attorneys and the
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turn, the costs of litigation in a given area determine the likelihood of settlement and thus the net costs and compensation. Litigation constitutes the opportunity cost of both sides. Since the transaction costs of a settlement are low
otherwise, the costs of litigation should be the primary determinant of cost
levels and allocations in settlement. Settlement, then, is a crucial aspect of the
asbestos phenomenon. Though much has been written on the attempted nationwide class settlements in Ortiz65 and Amchem ,66 both of the class action settlements were rejected.67 The majority of asbestos cases proceed individually or
as smallish joined proceedings. Settlement, not trial, is the final stop for the
huge majority of cases. 68 This is not to say that procedural reforms in the civil
justice system are unimportant - they are. But they are important not necessarily on their own terms, but for the shadow they cast on settlement negotiations
between the parties. The true measure of a litigation reform is how it alters
settlement dynamics, and not how it affects the minute number of cases that are
actually tried under its rules.
The link between settlement and the detailed dynamics of litigation suggests that the two cannot be understood in isolation. In this Article, I will
attempt to induce from known facts about settlement to theories about the litigation process that generates those facts. Because litigation is the causal agent
behind settlements, the maker can be known by its makings. The high price of
attorney services in asbestos settlements is the fact - from that fact, plausible
theories can be generated about the character asbestos litigation must possess in
order for that fact to be true.
II.

THEORY 1:

PROCEDURAL INNOVATION, SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTY

This Section presents a first theory - that the uncertainty in application of
the causation standards in asbestos litigation guts the effectiveness of procedural reform.
A.

The Model, and the Pitfalls of ProceduralReform

The standard law and economics model of settlement states that the likelihood of settlement is dictated by two factors - the joint costs of proceeding
forward, and the spread in the parties' valuations of the likely judgment. 69 The
parties settle when the sum of the plaintiffs costs, Cp, and defendant's costs,
CD, of proceeding are greater than the difference between the plaintiff's valuation, Vp, and defendant's valuation, VD.
CP + CD > VP - VD

defense attorneys have settled so many claims, the actual mechanics of settlement, once the
parties' expectations on the value of the case have converged, should be relatively costless.
65 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
66 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
67

Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864-65; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597.

68 CARROLL ET AL.,
69 RICHARD

A.

supra note 3, at 45.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

supra note 61, at 4.

609 (5th ed. 1998); Priest & Klein,
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The spread in valuations is the potential prize of going forward, Vp - VD.
That prize is worth pursuing, however, only if it is greater than the joint costs
of going forward, Cp + CD. Parties will settle otherwise, in effect using the
savings from settlement to fill in the gap of their valuations of the case.
This simple model provides a surprising amount of leverage in deciding
the likely effect of procedural reforms on litigation. In general, procedural
reforms that lower the cost of proceeding deeper into the litigation (for instance
technological efficiencies in docket management) inhibit settlement because
they lower the joint costs of proceeding, Cp + CD. At the margin, then, disputes
with smaller spreads in valuation become candidates for further litigation.
After all, why not go forward when there is so much to gain, and the costs so
low? Mathematically, when Cp + CD decreases, while the valuation spread, Vp
- VD, remains the same, a smaller set of term values will satisfy the settlement
condition. The surprising implication is that a set of procedural reforms may
actually decrease total judicial efficiency, because more cases will be litigated
deeper into the process. The increased number of cases brought (for bringing
cases becomes economical when it previously would not have been) drives up
costs, and the system re-equilibrates, under some conditions at the exact same
level of delay and cost as before. 70 The effect on the overall costs of the system is ambiguous; it is possible that the per-case savings will outweigh the
costs of administering the larger number of cases that are brought under the
lower cost structure. It is equally possible that the overall costs of the system
will increase. To see why, suppose that the plaintiffs valuation of a case is 4,
and the defendant's is 3. Initially, the cost of going forward to determine the
actual value of a case is 2. Under this set of circumstances, the case should
settle. Neither the defendant nor the plaintiff will pay 2 in order to obtain
information about the value of the claim. Thus, the 2 is never paid, and the
case settles costlessly. Now suppose that judicial reform greatly accelerates the
process, so that the cost of going forward is now .5. The settlement range has
constricted, and now neither party will settle. Each is willing to pay the .5 in
order to get extra information about the value of the claim. Since the .5 is now
actually paid, rather than merely threatened, the cost of the system has
increased.
This example is rigged, of course, but the principle should be clear. Procedural reforms not only might fail to bring costs down, but might increase
them. These sorts of reforms predictably, then, tend not to achieve the desired
effects.
In a different set of cases, real improvement is possible. Allowing parties
to determine rapidly the true value of cases encourages settlement, because it
decreases the spread in party valuations of the case. This increases the range of
cases where the joint costs are greater than the spread in valuations, and so
cases settle more frequently. Mathematically, Vp-VD decreases, and so the set
of term values that will satisfy the settlement condition increases. These
reforms can be procedural or substantive. A substantive rule providing absolute liability, for instance, would result in a drastic decrease in judicial
caseload, because parties would have no incentive to litigate a whole set of
'o See Priest, supra note 63, at 557.
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issues; since valuation is easier, cases should settle more often. Procedural
reforms that allow faster or earlier determination of key issues can increase
settlement as well. Such reforms might also reduce litigation costs; to the
extent they do, they provide an incentive to litigate further. However, to the
extent they provide greater and earlier certainty in outcomes, such reforms
lower the spread in valuation of the litigation looking forward, and therefore
encourage settlement. Popular alternative dispute resolution techniques, such
as early neutral evaluation, attempt to provide confidence as to the likely value
of a case."' The idea is to promote settlement by lowering the valuation spread.
If done according to theory, early neutral evaluation seems an unambiguously
cost-reducing step. Summary judgment, on the other hand, can be seen as an
ambiguous reform. Greater certainty is achieved earlier in the process as to the
valuation of the claim, but the reduced probable cost of going to summary
judgment rather than a whole trial might discourage settlement. The balance of
these two effects determines the effect on the likelihood and timing of settlement and, therefore, the overall transactions costs of a system after summary
judgment is introduced.
For a certain set of claims, the costs of litigation are greater than the anticipated verdict for either party to the litigation. However, those suits may still
settle for a positive value, even when both parties have an expectation of a zero
judgment for the plaintiff. In fact, these cases are overwhelmingly likely to
settle, because the spread in valuation is minimal and the costs high. These
"strike suits" may constitute a very large portion of the asbestos docket.72 The
RAND study came forward with the shocking finding that a huge proportion of
the asbestos docket consists of plaintiffs who are not currently impaired.7 3
These cases may well be affected by purely procedural efficiency, because the
costs they are able to inflict are the source of their settlement value. However,
the effectiveness of procedural reform, as will become clear, depends on the
system reliably coming to the correct substantive conclusion: that these cases
are in fact meritless. If, as I suggest below, these claims have a highly uncertain value, procedural reforms will not generally have the desired effect. The
uncertainty makes the likelihood of settlement impervious to certain levels of
procedural reform, because the litigation costs will outweigh the valuation
spread even after the reforms have been undertaken.
The law and economics model also has certain normative implications.
Settlement is applauded under the model, because by definition it entails lower
costs than litigation. There are no tradeoffs, because there is no cost-justified
procedure that will result in greater certainty on the underlying value of the
claim. When the dispute has no externalities, settlement is therefore to be
encouraged. Savings to the public, often a goal of procedural reform, is not
within the model, but is certainly important. Again, when the dispute has no
externalities, public expenditures are pure loss.
Another important feature of parties' litigation decision is that the parties
decide whether to settle or go forward at every stage of the litigation, so it is
71 RICHARD L. MARCUS

72 CARROLL ET AL.,
73

Id.

& EDWARD F.

SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION

supra note 3, at xxi.

944 (4th ed. 2004).
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possible that reforms have cross-cutting effects on the likelihood of settlement.
A reform of the early stages of litigation might decrease the rate of settlement
by lowering costs, while a change in substantive law might decrease uncertainty, thus increasing the likelihood of settlement. The combination of these
reforms is factored in at each stage, ignoring sunk costs. So, after summary
judgment, for instance, the question is whether the remaining uncertainty in
trial outcome justifies the joint cost of going to trial. If not, the parties will
settle, irrespective of what they would have done if summary judgment were
not an option.
If the spread increases, meaning that uncertainty rises, then litigation
becomes more attractive, unless there is an even larger increase in the costs of
going forward. If the spread declines, then participants' assessments of the trial
outcome converge, and settlement becomes more likely. If costs of going forward rise, the impulse is to settle, because the difference in valuation is not
worth the candle of going deeper into litigation. If costs decline, litigation
increases. If both costs and valuation spread rise, the results are ambiguous, as
if costs and spread both decrease.
With asbestos, the reforms have predominantly consisted of the purely
procedural type, which decreases the joint costs of going forward in the litigation."4 The goal has been to lower the cost of taking a claim to completion.
The model is clear that when this happens, the result is more litigation, not
less.75 It is important to discuss the form that "more litigation" is likely to take,
however. Commentators have claimed that this procedural efficiency is the
direct cause of the enormous number of new asbestos claims. 76 This assessment cannot be correct without more, because the model does not say anything
about the filing of claims, only their resolution. Because filing is so inexpensive and has the feature of preserving the claim against limitations periods, it is
more likely that the filing of claims has to do with attorneys' beliefs that their
claims are colorable under the operative substantive law. As a simple example,
suppose that the district courts become tremendously speedy and efficient at
resolving patent claims. That does not mean that I will bring a patent claim.
What it might mean is that I will pursue deeper litigation of the claim should it
be colorable to begin with.
Thus, certain kinds of procedural efficiency should not affect the bringing
of claims. The combination of costs and substantive rules, however, can create
the impetus for more claims. For instance, a judicial ruling abolishing the need
for proof of causation would surely cause more claims to be brought. However, such a rule would not necessarily cause the judicial system to be
overburdened; the burden would depend on the remaining uncertainty in litigation. An avalanche of newly-filed claims could be met with an avalanche of
settlement of equal magnitude. The judicial system would suffer from some
added paperwork, but no great amount of agony. The number of claims and the
cost of resolving claims must be analyzed discreetly.
74 Id. at 28-30.

" See Priest & Klein, supra note 61, at 12-13.

76 Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 606 (1997).
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As an example of how the model deals with procedural reforms, take consolidation of trials. Consolidation certainly does lower the per claim cost of
proceeding deeper into the litigation and completing the trial. To that extent,
consolidation should increase the prevalence of proceeding to trial. Additionally, the multiplication of the parties presumably multiplies the spread in
expected values by the same amount. Because this multiplier is greater than the
cost multiplier, the chances of proceeding increase. This observation could
explain the RAND report's finding that most trials proceed on a consolidated
basis.7 7
Alternatively, consolidation could decrease the gap in party valuation.
Consolidation might result in more certain plaintiffs' verdicts because the trial
will emphasize the claims of plaintiffs with the clearest entitlements to recovery, or because the fact of consolidation causes juries to assume wrongdoing.
If consolidated trials result in more certain plaintiffs' verdicts, then consolidated cases will tend to settle, since there is nothing to be gained from proceeding forward. However, this quick settlement does not occur because of
procedural reform, but rather the substantive skew that results from the change.
As this discussion has hopefully made clear, many procedural reforms
have the perverse effect of lowering litigation costs and encouraging resort to
litigation rather than settlement; the overall costs of the system might even
increase as a result of the changes. It should not be surprising, then, that such
procedural reforms have failed to produce the desired effects. Other procedural
reforms are not really procedural at all, but are ways to change the substantive
law by adjusting the nature of each party's proof. These reforms might
increase the chance of settlement, but should not be read as purely procedural
matters.
B.

The Need for Substantive Clarity

The structure of the settlement model suggests that bottlenecks can occur:
that is, an issue that is an important but small component of the legal proof can
prevent settlement, so long as that factor controls the parties' valuation spread.
Procedural reforms that lower the cost of proceeding without addressing this
substantive issue certainly will not decrease overall transaction costs, and may
increase them. As this Subsection will argue, asbestos litigation contains just
such a substantive bottleneck. As a result of the difficulty in proving legal
causation of injury, the valuation of a claim is tremendously uncertain until
fairly late in the proceedings.
The savings in transactions costs in the Manville Trust can be directly
attributed to the Trust's elimination of the causation bottleneck. A simple
regime of exposure and duration has replaced the open-ended standards favored
by courts at all levels of the judiciary.7 8 The Manville claim form is ten pages
long, and the meat of the claim can be disposed of in a page or two. 7 9 Since the
standards for recovery depend on heuristic rules as to exposure and disease
category, rather than a case by case proof of medical and legal causation, valua77 CARROLL ET AL., supra

note 3, at 36.

78 See Manville Claim Form, supra note 27, at 4.

79 Id. at 4-5, 10.

Fall 20061

ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS

tion of a claim is straightforward, and the transaction costs to all sides therefore
decrease dramatically.
The most effective reforms to promote settlement and clear dockets are
those that lower the likely spreads of the parties' expected values. This is
accomplished by bringing parties' expectations into alignment at an early point
in the proceedings, or, perhaps, before the proceedings have even begun. One
way to do so is to provide clear substantive rules, which allow parties to predict
liability at an early stage. If the rule is clear enough, the spread is zero, and the
parties certainly settle. Another substantive reform is early identification of
meritless claims. Quick identification of such claims reduces the nuisance
value of the suits and transactions costs on both sides.
A fundamental failure of asbestos reform has been the courts' inability or
unwillingness to clarify the issues of causation and exposure. This is the central issue in the majority of asbestos trials,8 ° now that area-wide defenses, such
as the state-of-the-art defense, have been rejected.8" Because causation ultimately determines liability or non-liability, it is the bottleneck of asbestos litigation.8 2 In cases where the claimant is presently unimpaired, causation is
even more difficult, because the claimant lacks symptoms that give rise to an
inference of asbestos exposure. These cases constitute the large majority of the
asbestos docket.8 3 In a given case, parties can come to very different conclusions on the value of a claim, and so there is benefit to parties to go relatively
far into litigation prior to settling the claims.
84
Some commentators assume that because asbestos litigation is "mature,"
courts can easily apply the legal standards. 85 While this assumption is tempting, it is also untrue. The courts have provided only porous standards for evaluating the amount of exposure or the proof of causation.86 Even the
80 "The element of legal causation in asbestos personal injury cases is the premier hurdle for
asbestos victims." Brian M. DiMasi, Comment, The Threshold Level of Proof of Asbestos
Causation: The "Frequency, Regulatory and Proximity Test" and a Modified Summers v.
Tice Theory of Burden-Shifting, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 735, 738 (1995).
81 See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, 493 F.2d 1076, 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
82 Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standardsof Persuasion,
and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 376-77 (1986) ("Proving the cause of injuries
that remain latent for years, are associated with diverse risk factors, and occur at background
levels even without any apparent cause, is the 'central problem' for toxic tort plaintiffs.");
Simcha David Schonfeld, Note, Establishing the Causal Link in Asbestos Litigation: An
Alternative Approach, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 379, 383 (2002) ("[I]t is often difficult to prove
that exposure to any specific asbestos product was the cause of plaintiff's injuries. Most
asbestos plaintiffs were exposed to numerous products and cannot conclusively prove that
their injuries are the result of one specific product over another. To allow for recovery in
virtually any asbestos case, therefore, courts would be required to relax the standard causation requirements. Noting this dilemma, many courts have done just that.").
83 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 73-75.

84 McGovern, supra note 76, at 607.
85 "Asbestos mass tort litigation is somewhat anomalous because the trial of individual
asbestos claims is fairly simple now that the law surrounding them is settled." Linda S.
Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: PostaggregativeProcedurein Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 566 (1991).
86 Jack B. Weinstein, Foreword to ERIC STALLARD ET AL., FORECASTING PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS:

EPIDEMIOLOGY AND MODELING IN THE MANVILLE ASBESTOS CASE

("We need more objective tests.").

xvi (2005)
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articulation of the standards is enough to demonstrate that they provide no real
clarity without a detailed factual analysis in every case. In Ohio, a prime asbestos litigation jurisdiction, the Lohrmann test states "[t]o support a reasonable
inference of substantial causation from circumstantial evidence, there must be
evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some
extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked." 8 7
This test does not specify how much exposure, how regularly, for how long, or
how close to where the plaintiff worked is necessary to prove causation. Further, proving each of those factors only gives rise to an inference of causation,
which presumably may be rebutted, though the means for doing so are again
unclear. In Washington, a plaintiff must establish a "reasonable connection
between the injury, the product causing the injury, and the manufacturer of that
product."8 " Other jurisdictions have adopted variations on this theme, adopting
standards like the
"substantial and direct causal link" test.... the "inference of exposure" test; the
"substantial contributing cause" test; a standard "requir[ing] the plaintiff to show that
he was exposed to a defendant's asbestos-containing product by working with or in
the asbestos product to
close proximity to the product"; and a standard that requires
' 89
play "a role in the occurrence of the plaintiff's injuries.

In Texas, the state with the largest number of asbestos filings, juries are
routinely given causation instructions like this: Were the defendants' defective
products "a producing cause of [plaintiff's] mesothelioma? . . . '[p]roducing

cause' means an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause that, in a natural
sequence, produced the injury. '"90 This requires more than showing an elevated
epidemiological risk, 91 but beyond that, the Texas courts have provided no

additional guidance on what is necessary or sufficient to prove causation.
The difficulty in proving asbestos disease causation is not held in common
with other torts. The long latency of asbestos diseases means that the plaintiff
often is held to proof of events that took place long in the past.92 Moreover,
some asbestos diseases are indistinguishable from diseases caused by other factors. 93 Asbestos causal uncertainty is thus in a distinctive category, even
among toxic torts.
The uncertainty from the causation standards has come in two forms:
first, there is very little information that a plaintiff can give to prove causation
and exposure in a summary stage, and second, there is nothing a defendant can
do to disprove causation at a summary stage. Though perhaps unenunciated
rules of thumb9 4 may have developed in the course of processing so much
litigation, the rules themselves seem unusually flexible in their application. In
evaluating an asbestos claim, the plaintiff and the defendant must, however,
87 Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162-63
88 Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 744 P.2d 605, 612 (Wash. 1987).
89 DiMasi, supra note 80, at 744.
90 2004 Tex. Dist. Ct. Jury Instr. 170415A.

(4th Cir. 1986).

9' Merrell Dow. Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 720 (Tex. 1997).
92 DiMasi, supra note 80.
93 See STALLARD ET AL., supra note 86.
9 One can imagine, for instance, a kind of informal grid of settlement payouts, comparable
to those used in the Manville Trust.
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come to conclusions on causation to settle the case. Though some cases will be
easy - certainly long-term asbestos workers with mesothelioma are such cases
- a large heartland of cases is very difficult. As many efficiencies as the court
system may have developed in response to the asbestos crisis, the cost of
resolving the causation issue is simply insusceptible to much reduction. When
the vast majority of asbestos claimants are exposure-only claimants, the question becomes even more difficult, because the treatment of damages can vary
wildly. In the case of causation, it is not that the legal standard is unknown; the
standard is known, but very difficult to work with. The legal standard does not
provide heuristic rules like the Manville Trust, but rather imposes onerous
requirements of proof and disproof on the parties. Reformers have been sensitive to the problem, but their proposed solutions such as "[t]he subjective definition of 'substantial factor' [causation] proposed here may be expressed as a
connection between exposure and injury which is close enough to warrant liability," 95 do not fare much better.
The dynamics of the causation rules mean that the parties have no way to
avoid significant litigation if they wish to accurately value claims. 96 The costs
that plaintiffs, even with no valid claim, can inflict on defendants are therefore
significant. Because the opportunity cost is the amount plaintiffs' lawyers
would receive in litigation, preventing them from bringing the litigation
requires compensation for roughly that amount. In a litigation environment
where any case could go to trial, plaintiffs' attorneys have significant settlement leverage.
It should be noted that the difficulty in valuation does not by itself inhibit
settlement; the difficulty must manifest itself in the defendant and plaintiff disagreeing about the valuation. If valuation is difficult, but each side projects the
claim as centered on the same value, and has the same risk attitude, the case
will settle, despite its unpredictability. To explain why the porous causation
standards result in greater costs, the theory must give an argument for why
plaintiffs' and defense attorneys routinely disagree about the values of their
cases. One plausible assumption is that attorneys tend to be optimistic about
their own abilities. Another possibility is based on the endowment effect, a
phenomenon discovered by cognitive psychologists where people overvalue
their current endowments relative to alternatives. Cognitive psychologists have
illustrated that people tend to be happy with what they have, even when that
assignment is essentially arbitrary. 97 Lawyers may well be subject to the
endowment effect, resulting in an artificially rosy perception of the case they
have relative to the settlement they might have. Indeed, such a cognitive
defense mechanism may be essential in a profession of hired guns, whose
assignment to one side or another is often arbitrary. Of course, since attorneys
95

Gold, supra note 82, at 395-96.

96

See Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judg-

ment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 102 (1990) (finding that proceeding to and past summary judgment
is extremely expensive for plaintiffs and may diminish settlement).
97 Jack L. Knetch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference
Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989) (citing a study finding preference for current property endowment, regardless of arbitrariness of initial assignment).
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litigate only one side of the asbestos docket, such repeat play should cement
attitudes even more.
Empirically, the theory that causation prevents procedural reforms from
being effective has at least some support. Even to the extent that first-wave
defendants (the manufacturers) came to concede causation or develop simple
heuristics, second-wave (premises) defendants are less likely to have done so.
Strict liability theories are less likely to apply to premises defendants, since
they are not likely to have been under a duty to warn at the time of the exposure. Thus, the complexity of the causation question has not declined, even in
the face of experience. As the causation issue becomes more difficult, the
increased costs associated with that complexity outweigh whatever cost savings
have emerged from procedural reform. Most importantly, because causation is
usually a question for a jury, and not for a judge,9 8 parties know that any
heuristics that might have been used by judges if they decided the cases will not
be used by juries. There is no opportunity, then, for the nebulous causation
standards to change sub silentio into more concrete rules. The jury is a one-off
player, which lacks the systemic wisdom of the other participants. Any folk
wisdom in the asbestos bar and the judges who relate to it is unlikely to percolate to the jury.
Additionally, the RAND study observes that settlement is becoming less
likely because defendants are settling less often.9 9 The Center for Claims Resolution, a defendant created settlement facility, stopped agreeing to "inventory
settlements"" when it became clear that the settlements had no effect on the
number of remaining claims.' ' This suggests a tendency to go deep into litigation, a tendency consistent both with the substantive uncertainty discussed
here, and with defendant risk-preference discussed in Section III.
The causation issue is a general symptom of "asbestos law," where judges
stretch and redefine traditional theories of liability to promote recovery. 10 2 The
problem in formulating a special tort law for asbestos cases is not only that it
penalizes companies for actions that were not illegal when taken. The problem
is that "asbestos law" diminishes predictability; potential defendants may have
an ominous sense about liability, but an ominous sense cannot be programmed
in a meaningful way into the value calculation. A judge and jury facing the
nebulous standards articulated above are capable of reaching any outcome from a defense verdict to millions in punitive damages. This imprecision is
reflected in the depth of litigation pursued; additional discovery and motion
practice are undertaken to generate sufficient facts to lower the spread in valuations of claims.
Various theories of burden shifting, such as market-share liability, have
been offered as solutions to the causation problem. °3 Courts have not
98 See, e.g., 2004 Tex. Dist. Ct. Jury Instr. 170415A.

99 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 96-97.
100 Settlements on standard terms offered to plaintiffs' attorneys for their entire inventories
of cases. See id. at 129.
't' Id. at xvii.
102 Brickman, supra note 32, at 1887-88.
103 See Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive CollateralEstoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in ASBESTOS Litigation, 70 IowA L. REv. 141, 207 n. 374
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accepted these theories. 0 4 There has thus been no substitute for an individual
trial on the question of exposure and causation. Reforms in this area would be
most welcome, but mere verbal reformulations of the current tests are unlikely
to be helpful. Rather, heuristics involving certain provable levels of exposure
and form of asbestos are more likely to lead to predictable and consistent
results.
The causation problem is even more difficult in the second wave of asbestos litigation, the set of cases not involving asbestos workers. The workers had
access to at least some business records involving the asbestos in their workplaces. Other plaintiffs are not likely to have this information. Particularly for
exposure-only plaintiffs, the exposure can be so brief that documenting which
product from which company caused the spot on the lung can be extremely
difficult.
It is also worth considering that tenuous causation theories, if they make it
through summary judgment, are likely to create extreme uncertainty in the trial
verdict. Juries may push back against attenuated causation theories, or perhaps
not - it is quite unclear what juries will do with these claims, which are in
dispute even among experts.' 0 5 The spread in valuation increases when the
legal theory is novel, and the expense of resolving the issue is high - indeed,
this is a consequence of the model, because parties will only pay for certainty
when the value of resolving the uncertainty is worth the costs.'0 6 The uncertainty thus extends through the litigation process, and is likely to escalate as the
asbestos bar confronts more and more novel theories of recovery. There is no
reason to think, then, that procedural reform will have any more success than it
has had in the last twenty years.
My argument depends not on the ease of recovery, but on the uncertainty
of recovery. Previous explanations have chalked up the litigation boom to eas10 7
ier recoveries, brought about by changes in the substantive tort law.
McGovern argues that demand for plaintiffs' attorneys' services is driven by
the expected payout for the plaintiff."0 8 The payout, at least for the price-setting marginal litigants, is obviously set by substantive rules governing recovery. If the legal system makes it easier for marginal litigants to recover, as in
the asbestos litigation context, demand goes up, in turn driving up the price of
the attorney services required to get those payouts.' 0 9 George Priest discussed
a similar equilibrium process in his article on case management reform in Cook
County, Illinois." ° This argument is adequate in a static system, where the
supply of plaintiffs' attorney services is at the long-run, cost-minimizing equilibrium. However, the litigation market, like any other market, should be
dynamic. The fees to be earned by meeting the higher demand should, in the
(1984) (noting, however, that presumptions adopted in Borel may have eased the proof as
much as a theory of market share liability).
104 Id.
lO5 DiMasi, supra note 80, at 752-53.
106 Priest, supra note 63, at 532-33.
107 McGovern, supra note 76, at 605-06.
108 Id.
109 Id.

110 See Priest, supra note 63, at 544-45.
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long run, induce an expansion of supply as more producers/attorneys enter the
market. When supply increases, the price of legal services should re-equilibrate. If the legal system has sufficiently lowered the costs associated with
litigation, the price should re-equilibrate at a lower level than before the
demand increase. Regardless of the trajectory of the long-run supply, price
should adjust downward after the initial substance-driven increase. This indicates that even demand-driven explanations (easier payouts mean more lawsuits) require a supplementary supply-driven explanation for their results to
stand over the long term (i.e., attorney supply is at long run cost-minimizing
equilibrium). Why does supply not expand so as to permanently capture at
least some of the marginal cost savings induced by procedural reform? The
change in the substantive standard of recovery cannot produce the static costs
result by itself. It requires a very specific, and in my view, improbable assumption about the supply of legal services.
Having concluded that the failure of courts to articulate clear rules on
proof of causation is responsible for the high costs of recovery for asbestos
claimants, I now attempt to justify the obvious alternative: clearer rules that
provide greater predictability and therefore induce settlement and lower costs.
In a thought-provoking piece, Donald Elliott has written that mass torts should
not be viewed as dispensing purely individual justice."' Rather, toxic torts
invoke a host of social values that should be invited into the system.' 12 Some
such values are efficiency and the society's views on risk and regulation. Elliott's perspective implies that the asbestos issue requires compromise of a variety of social values; for instance, perhaps, social savings via reduced
transactions costs can justify a sleeker causation standard, even though that
standard may not be best from a fairness or compensation perspective. The
question here is a more general question about what to do when nebulous legal
standards inflate the costs of litigation. It may be that some "accuracy" (which
must mean optimality of deterrence, compensation, or justice) is compromised
by replacing standards with rules." 3 However, whatever increase in accuracy
there might be should be weighed against the additional costs that the system
and the litigants sustain. Particularly since uncertainty makes settlement difficult and implies greater costs for society, claimants, and defendants alike, those
costs are real losses, and must somehow be tested against the distributional
goals of the tort system. People might differ on the merits of moving to a rule'II E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable
Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REV. 781 (1988).
112 Id. at 782.
13 I am skeptical of this proposition, though a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of
this paper. A credible argument could be made, however, that the causation standard represents an accommodation to the inherent uncertainty in the civil justice system. Standards
make it difficult to point to an outcome as wrong - by making determinations fact-sensitive,
the reallocation of resources by the civil justice system cannot be demonstrably unfair in any
particular case. Setting a rule admits of the essential arbitrariness in parts of the civil litigation standard: by drawing a line, the 'law is forced to confront that the disparate treatment of
those immediately on one side of the line from those on the other is imperfect justice. The
reluctance is understandable, and is perhaps the reason why a regulatory venue is the most
likely for declaring clear rules, where the decision can be cloaked in neutral expertise.
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but it appears that the market eventually drives in that direcbased system,'
tion, as the repeated attempts at mass settlement of asbestos claims, via class
action, claims resolution facilities, and, ultimately, bankruptcy demonstrate.
The procedures by which litigants circumvented the usual civil litigation disposition of their claims can be questioned, but the fact remains that it was done;
the adoption of streamlined causation
the cheaper payment of claims through
5
and exposure tests won the day."
George Priest has written of the pitfalls in adopting a purely procedural
outlook on aggregation techniques." 6 Often, the values that produce procedural innovation - fairness among claimants, adequacy of compensation, and
transactions costs - relate to substantive compensation and deterrence values. 1 17 To treat these matters without taking substantive rules and outcomes
into account is to season the soup by changing the pot. Because procedure is
inseparably intertwined with the questions being adjudicated, the two must be
considered together. The failure of asbestos procedural reform illustrates the
pitfalls of trying to refine procedure in isolation.
In summary, pure aggregation techniques often have little effect on the
costs of litigation. Dynamic effects from these techniques encourage the filing
of more suits, and thus greater litigation. Procedural reform also is likely to fail
in the face of bottlenecks. In the asbestos context, and perhaps in other mass
torts, causation and exposure provide just such a bottleneck. The persistence of
vague and unmanageable causation standards prevents litigation reform from
substantially reducing costs. Only a shift to an administrative scheme, such as
the Manville Trust, can significantly increase the clarity of the legal rule and
enable fast, low-cost settlements of asbestos claims.
III.

THEORY 2:

RIsK-LOvING DEFENDANTS AND INSURERS

A second theory of the failure of procedural reform is that defendants and
their insurers began taking greater risks, extending the length of litigation and
driving up the costs of recovery for plaintiffs. I argue that defendants' insolvency and caps on insurance liability generated excess risk-taking, increasing
the incentive to litigate. Once the diluvian number of asbestos claims became
clear, a large set of defendants faced probable liabilities greater than their
assets.' 18 The litigation incentives of companies in the zone of insolvency are
well known. Their risk attitudes change greatly, because the expected outcome
threatens their existence." 9 Thus, they are willing to take a chancier lottery if
I" Compare Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927) (Holmes,
J.) (announcing clear if somewhat baffling rule for contributory negligence of drivers
approaching grade crossings) with Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1934)
(Cardozo, J.) (abandoning rule in favor of standards-based approach).
"
Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98
Nw. U. L. REV. 1435, 1480 (2004).
116

See Priest, supra note 63.

Id. at 544-47.
McGovern, supra note 2, at 1726.
119
When the corporation is insolvent or at the brink of insolvency, the difference in
risk preference between shareholders and creditors is magnified with respect to corporate investment policies. During this period of financial stress, shareholders favor
1'7
118
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there are some outcomes that enable them to survive, even if those outcomes
are unlikely. In the extreme, they have incentives to gamble recklessly,
because a more moderate strategy yields no chance of survival, while an
extreme strategy, even though the expected return is lower, contains the possibility of survival. Debtholders suffer from these tactics because they receive no
upside from the higher risk, but bear the brunt of the downside. For this reason,
the law sometimes intervenes to prevent insolvent companies from acting on
those incentives.' 2 ° For instance, fiduciary duties normally owed to equityholders transfer to debtholders when the company is within the zone of insolvency.' 2' Tort claimants, though they are formally creditors just as any
contract claimant would be, must still prove their claims. Litigation to determine liability and amount is not a breach of duty. 122 Litigation strategy is
therefore one area among many where companies in the zone of insolvency are
likely to show excessive risk preference.
Insurance might be available to combat this excessive risk preference, but
failed in the asbestos context because insurers were against their policy limits.
Insurers often take the lead in defense of claims, because if they are paying,
they need control over the litigation; the agency problems in allowing an
insured to handle its own defense are too great, especially when the insured can
count on insurance to cover most of the loss. An insured is usually indifferent
as to where a claim settles, so long as the settlement is within policy limits.
The insurer therefore must step in to protect its interests. Insurers are configured to be risk-neutral with regard to most claims.'23 This neutrality breaks
down, however, as the expected value of the claim exceeds the policy limits.12 4
Once that occurs, an insurer will be risk loving unless the law intervenes: if
litigating the claim brings even a small probability of liability below the policy
limits, the insurer has an incentive to take that risk. If the policy limit is a
dollar, an insurer will choose litigation over a settlement for $1.01, even if the
litigation risks a judgment of two dollars, or a million, so long as there is some
chance that the outcome will come under the policy limits.
highly risky projects, even if these projects have only a slight chance of generating
income large enough to cover the firm's debt and still provide some return to shareholders. In contrast, creditors want management to preserve the assets available to
satisfy their claims by investing conservatively and taking minimal risk.
Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: ProperScope of Directors'

Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1489 (1993).
120 E.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., 17 Del. J. Corp.
L 1099, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991) (holding that fiduciary duty shifts to creditors
when corporation in the zone of insolvency).
121 See, e.g., Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1981).
122 See Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 839 F.2d 198 (1988) (contesting tort liability while
in bankruptcy).
123 Indeed, the risk neutrality of insurers is what drives the insurance market. Risk averse
companies are willing to pay higher than the expected value of their losses (through premiums) in order to eliminate the risk of a higher-than-expected loss. The insurer, by pooling
risks together, reduces the chance of the catastrophic loss, since a higher than expected loss
will usually be offset by other losses that do not materialize. The risk neutral insurer can
then profit from the willingness of risk adverse parties to pay more to lower their risk
profiles.
124 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967).

Fall 20061

ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS

Of course, the insured detests this strategy, because when it fails, as it
often does, resulting in an astronomical verdict or settlement, the insurer's liability is bounded by the policy limits, but the insured's is not. The insured
remains on the hook for the remaining liability above the policy limits. This
dynamic has caused the law to step in to protect the policyholder's interests in
the context of settlement. Rules of good faith require the insurer to litigate the
claim as if it bears the entire risk.12 5 To operate in good faith is to extend riskneutrality over the entire risk, not just the insured portion of the risk, where
such neutrality comes naturally to the insurer. 126
The insured is charged with policing the insurer's behavior in this regard;
the insured brings the bad faith claim if the insurer has acted contrary to his
interests. Though there may be problems with monitoring, the system on the
whole seems well-designed. The insurer can prevent the insured from gambling with its money by taking control of the defense, and the insured likewise
checks the insurer when the policy limits are likely to be exceeded. The
insured has every incentive, usually, to try to monitor the insurer's behavior
and make sure that the insurer, for instance, accepts reasonable settlement
offers within the policy limits. The net effect of the system should generally be
that insurance makes no difference in how claims are litigated; the insurer,
when checked with an obligation of good faith, should litigate claims exactly as
the insured would.
The system of checks breaks down, however, when the insured is in the
zone of insolvency and the insurer is near the policy limits. When both of these
conditions are met, both relevant actors have incentives to pursue risky litigation strategies. The insurer is inclined to gamble in the hopes of getting an
improbably favorable outcome. The insured is also inclined to gamble, since to
do so opens the possibility of survival as a company. In general, this means
refusing a more certain sum in favor of a riskier lottery with both an upside and
a downside. Specifically, the incentive is to refuse settlement in favor of more
litigation. The insolvency of defendants and the policy limits of their insurers 12 7 combine to produce risky litigation strategy by asbestos defendants.
Regardless of who ultimately bears operational responsibility for the litigation,
the strategy pursued is likely to be the same. Indeed, the only difference
between insurer and insured is a preference that the other bear the costs. Going
deeper into litigation, which is the manifestation of the risky litigation strategy,
takes time and consumes resources, driving up transaction costs for all
involved. As the asbestos crisis has deepened, insurers and defendants have
increasingly possessed these unusual incentives to litigate excessively, 2 8 and

125

Id. at 176.

Id.
Asbestos manufacturer insurers have progressively hit their aggregate coverage limits
since 1985, though much coverage litigation still takes place. However, expansion of liabil126
127

ity means that more insurance is being tapped (and exhausted), leading to a continuation of
the dynamics described here.
128 Seventy-three asbestos defendants have filed for bankruptcy, with bankruptcies occurring at an increasing rate. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 109.
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so even in the face of greater legal certainty, 12 9 defendants might be expected
to act as though the law were unsettled.
It is now useful to apply the settlement model described above to the
insolvency problem. Under the assumptions discussed above, defendants perceive a lower value of the case, for their insolvency means they may never need
to pay it. For instance, if the true value of a case is a probability distribution
from 0 to 10, with a mean of 5, then a rational defendant assesses the value of
the case at 5, and makes its settlement determination from there. However,
suppose the defendant goes bankrupt if it has to pay 5. That means that for any
case value of 5 or greater, the actual payment is 5, and not the value of the
judgment. Thus, the defendant's value is no longer 5, but is significantly less.
For instance, if each value between 0 and 10 had equal probability, the old
expected value was 5, but the new expected value is less than 4. This increases
the average spread between defense valuation and plaintiff valuation, assuming
the plaintiff keeps the same assessment of the likely payout. Thus, Vp - VD has
decreased, and the settlement condition, with costs held equal, is less likely to
be fulfilled.
This model only explains reduced settlement likelihood if plaintiffs do not
also discount their likely judgments by the chance of defendant insolvency, i.e.
Vp remains constant. Certainly plaintiffs do not lack any of the cognitive powers of defendants, and so to sustain the theory, plaintiffs must have some other
reason to maintain the same risk attitude even as defendants and their insurers
become risk-preferring. If they properly adjust their expectations, then the
insolvency of the defendants will decrease the value of settlements, but will
otherwise have no effect on litigation dynamics.
I argue that plaintiffs make no mistake in assessing their claims at full
value, even when most possible defendants are insolvent. Joint and several
liability rules mean that a plaintiff can recover the full value of a judgment
from any of the defendants. 13 ° If there are sufficient solvent defendants in the
pool, then each defendant might discount his payout, without the plaintiff discounting his. So long as at least one defendant is solvent, then the defense
strategy will be risky, and the plaintiff will still have incentive to litigate. The
expansion of liability beyond the most likely liable parties has the effect of
deepening the defendant pool.131 With a sufficiently deep pool of solvent
defendants, plaintiffs properly assess their claims at full value.132 Greater litigation, of course, increases the net costs of the system.
129

Assuming such certainty really exists. See supra Section II.

130 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 10

(2000) ("When, under applicable law, some persons are jointly and severally liable to an
injured person, the injured person may sue for and recover the full amount of recoverable
damages from any jointly and severally liable person.").
131 See Senator Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case

for Reform, 64

DENY.

U. L.

REV.

651, 652 (1988).

132 Rational plaintiffs might choose not to bother with (nearly) insolvent defendants. The

rules of civil procedure allow the present defendants to bring in those other defendants,
however. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (impleader). It remains an option for the plaintiffs to
settle with the solvent parties. Various factors might conspire against this, including the
solvent defendants free-riding on the litigation expenditures of the insolvent ones.
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The next step in the analysis is to square my assertion of risk-preferring
defendants with the fact of ubiquitous asbestos settlements.' 33 The analysis
presented does not mean that there will necessarily be fewer settlements, only
that settlements come after a greater amount of litigation. Because the settleor-litigate decision is made at every step of the litigation where money can be
spent or information can be gained, a tendency toward risky litigation can cause
the case to go as far as, say, the end of discovery, or summary judgment, but
still result in settlement. Therefore, the characterization of defense risk attitudes here does not necessarily predict less total settlement activity, but it does
predict more litigation activity leading up to the settlements that occur.
One way to model litigation is for the parties to purchase information
about the value of the claim at each stage. Suppose that Vp - VI > Cp + CD,
meaning that the settlement condition is unfulfilled. By investing the litigation
costs needed to obtain information, for instance by engaging in discovery, filing motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, going to trial, and filing
appeals, parties increase their information on the value of the claim. At each
stage, the cost profile of going forward changes, because there is less information to be had and fewer litigation costs to be incurred. At the same time, when
they obtain new information, parties' estimates of claim value converge; the
initial spread in valuation is greater than the subsequent spread in valuation.
For instance, a court's rejection of a motion to dismiss' 34 signals to the defendant that the claim, perhaps, has more merit than initially thought. The defendant is therefore likely to increase its valuation of the case, bringing it in closer
alignment with that of the plaintiff. The decrease in valuation spread increases
the chance that the settlement condition will be met. When parties prefer
higher levels of risk, they will increase the depth of the litigation, and will
"purchase" more information, but only to a limited extent. No matter how riskpreferring the party, under some conditions settlement will look attractive.
Thus, the risk-preference model is perfectly consistent with widespread,
even ubiquitous, settlements. The crucial piece of data is information about
how deep into litigation parties tend to go. If the duration of the litigation is
not justified by the information that is gained - that is, if claims could be estimated with sufficient accuracy at less cost - then risk preference is driving a
greater amount of litigation. Unfortunately, there are no studies that have
addressed this question directly. Anecdotally, some commentators have found
that consolidated proceedings lead to exactly this kind of long proceeding:
"[consolidation] has resulted in lengthy trials and delay in compensation for
injured plaintiffs.""'
One could also study the empirics of asbestos risk preference by looking at
the evolution of litigation strategies over time. As it became clearer to more
asbestos defendants that they would soon be bankrupt, they should have
adopted riskier litigation tactics. Since many facts unique to particular litigated
cases drive an assessment of how risky a strategy is, the question presents a
challenge to outside observers. However, one possible indicator is defendants'
133

See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 10.

134 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

Valle Simms Dutcher, The Asbestos Dragon: The Ramifications of Creative Judicial
Management of Asbestos Cases, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 955, 957 (1993).
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use of the same arguments even after it has become clear that those arguments
are ineffective. Though the argument might be identical, the strategy is riskier,
because its estimated payoff is lower, even though the high and low ends are
the same. One clear example of this behavior seems to be the continued use of
the state-of-the-art defense. Though widely rejected, the defense continues to
appear in asbestos proceedings; after billions of dollars in claims have been
paid out, it is remarkable that defendants continue to litigate the issue.' 36 As
each rejection comes in, asbestos defendants should adjust downward their estimates of its success. 1 3 7 At a certain point, the likelihood of success does not
justify the costs of presentation. If my impression is correct, and the defense
continues to be used despite its general ineffectiveness, then defendants and
insurers are using a high-risk, low-expected value litigation tactic, which can
only be explained if they are risk-preferring.
One further piece of evidence is the collapse of the Center for Claims
Resolution (CCR) settlement body in 1991.138 The CCR was designed to facilitate quick settlements on standard terms with large numbers of plaintiffs and
potential plaintiffs. Defendants turned from a settlement-intensive strategy,
where many claims not even filed were settled on standard terms with prominent plaintiffs' firms, to a strategy of litigation-driven settlement, where certain
proofs needed to be made to a court.139 Such a strategy entails greater risks,
because settlement value can increase greatly once more information is uncovered, even if the case does not go to trial.1 40 It is perhaps unknowable at what
point defendants realized insolvency was inevitable, but the theory predicts a
marked increase in risk-taking when that moment occurred. If 1991 was the
moment of truth for most asbestos manufacturers, the collapse of the CCR
would be strong corroboration that the risk-preference dynamic was taking
place.
A final piece of empirical evidence supporting the idea that asbestos litigation takes longer, despite reform efforts, is the fact that the mean time from
filing to disposition in federal courts is long - about twenty-nine months. 4 '
This is vastly greater than the mean for other federal cases, which have a mean
time to disposition of 9.5 months over the relevant timeframe. 42 Of course,
many inferences could be drawn from this fact, perhaps having to do with the
MDL practice, judicial procrastination on asbestos claims, or collateral litigation. The most likely inference, based on the theory presented here, is that real
litigation activity is taking place in those cases, and as a result disposition times
are slower. This lapse in time supports my empirical claim that asbestos claims
136

See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.

137 The adage is "fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." The repeated

application Bayes' theorem, which dictates the proper assessment of likelihood of success in
light of new information, does not require such a quick learning curve. The message is the
same, however: defendants should adjust their expectations after repeated failure.
138 Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1052-53 (1995).
139 Id.
140 See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 10,

at 122-24.

Rice & Davis, supra note 42, at 127 n.4.
142 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2005 Annual Report of the Director:
Judicial Business of the United States Courts tbl. C-5 (2006).
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are prone to costly, lengthy litigation because of defendant risk attitude and the
causation bottleneck.
A general challenge to the risk-preference model might arise because the
claims asbestos companies face are not single, "bet-the-company" claims, but
rather a constellation of thousands of small, individual tort claims.143 One way
to view the multiplicity of claims is as one giant claim, with a range of possible
valuations, influenced by litigation strategy. This view makes sense if companies set litigation strategy once, with full knowledge of the range of possible
outcomes.
If claims are viewed discretely, then no individual claim can really be said
to implicate the bankruptcy dynamics illustrated here; no individual claim has
the capacity to put a company into the zone of insolvency. Taken one by one,
then, each claim should best be dealt with on a risk-neutral basis. But this view
is hard to sustain; companies would be foolish not to have an aggregate strategy
for dealing with an elephantine mass of claims. Similarly, insurers should also
aggregate claims at least on a per-company basis to evaluate the potential exposure and appropriate litigation strategy. At that level, an insolvent actor is
likely to take more risks, even at higher average costs. Those additional risks
manifest themselves in the asbestos context in longer pushes through discovery
and summary judgment, at high cost, prior to settlement.
The question arises whether anything positive can be said about risk-preference driven increase in litigation. In the first theory, involving the vague and
subjective standards for assessing asbestos liability, at least some argument
could be made that the causation bottleneck more effectively screened claims
deserving of compensation."
A riskier litigation strategy possesses some other attractive features for
defendants. A litigation-heavy strategy, if credible, might deter negative value
suits, suits in which the estimated cost of recovery does not justify the costs of
bringing the claim. 145 Plaintiffs with low-value claims are unlikely to bring
them if a defendant credibly commits to litigating claims in full; if the plaintiff
believes that protracted litigation is needed to extract the value of the negative
value claim, which by definition is less than the cost of procuring it, then the
plaintiff should not rationally bring the claim. This benefit to defendants of
deterring negative-value suits only accrues if the commitment to litigate is in
fact widely believed. I am agnostic on this possibility; the strategy can work
when a significant number of outcomes involve defense verdicts or small plaintiffs' verdicts. But a history of large plaintiffs' verdicts makes a take-no-prisoners approach unviable in the long run. 146 Deterring negative-value suits thus
cannot provide a complete explanation for a high-cost, high-risk approach; on
the other hand, the risk attitude considerations described above provide a credible rationale for such a strategy. In general, then, increased risk preference by
defendants, and deeper litigation for that reason, is descriptively understandable
but normatively hard to justify. The analysis suggests that to the extent that
deeper litigation is taking place only because of defense risk attitudes, courts
143 CARROLL ET AL.,
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supra note 3, at 23.

Or achieved other values, such as fairness. See Elliott, supra note 111, at 784-85,
Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 530 (1997).
CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 95-96.
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should be on the watch for such risky behavior. As courts have a responsibility
to protect debtholders to which an insolvent company has a fiduciary relationship, courts similarly
have a duty to protect tort claimants who might be simi147
larly vulnerable.
The first and second theories connect nicely. The second theory - that
defendants and insurers, because they are often in the zone of insolvency or at
policy limits, are willing to take untoward risks - provides added incentive to
litigate the substantive bottlenecks emphasized in the first theory. Similarly,
the causation bottleneck in the first theory provides the uncertainty needed for
risk preference to play a role. Without some level of uncertainty as to liability,
no amount of desire for risk would trigger litigation, the same way that without
a jackpot, no one would enter a lottery. The two theories are therefore complementary; as modeled using the economic model of settlement, both theories
predict a higher spread in asbestos case valuations than in other sorts of cases.
The natural result of the interaction of defendant risk-taking and unclear standards is a decrease in settlement pressure and an increase in overall litigation
costs. Such a change is consistent with the failure of procedural reform to
decrease plaintiffs' costs. Costs will not decline until early settlement substitutes for costly litigation.
IV.

THEORY

3:

PRICE COLLUSION

A third possible theory, independent of the first two, is that plaintiffs'
lawyers have colluded to maintain high costs to their clients, even as their costs
have gone down. Such a scheme certainly would increase the transaction costs
of bringing asbestos claims, even if court-made procedural reforms would otherwise lower the costs. The effectiveness of procedural reform self-evidently
depends on whether the system passes the cost savings on to clients. The following Section, without ultimately judging the merits of the position, assesses
whether such a claim is credible and worthy of further investigation.
In general, it is unlikely that in a market with many suppliers, firms would
be able to successfully collude and maintain high prices. The character of a
cartel is that there are always incentives to defect, because a company can
attract disproportionate market share by slightly undercutting the cartel
price.1 4 8 The monitoring and coordination costs of preventing this defection
are high and grow higher the more actors there are in a cartel. 14 9 For good
reason, cartels are of greatest concern in small markets, with barriers to prevent
immediate entry by potential competitors.
Normally, the fact that everyone charges the same price is a sign of stability in a competitive market.' 5 o Competitors all charge the same price because
the market is stable, and each competitor has the same cost structure, which is
the minimum long term average cost.15 1 "Problematically, parallel conduct is
147
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150
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TAYLOR, supra note 52, at 306.
See id. at 308.

Id. at 65-68.
See id. at 222-24.
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often forced by circumstance: under such circumstances, a 'rational' profit
maximizing firm will always act similarly to its rivals."' 5 2 Collusion is therefore impossible to read directly from the price term, because perfectly competitive markets and cartel markets each will have uniform equilibrium prices.
Moreover, since price collusion is illegal,' 5 3 those involved have every incentive to keep it secret from the general public. Inferential proof of collusion is
1 54
often the best available.
Price collusion cannot be proved from an armchair, but antitrust law has
provided indicia in the absence of direct proof. The law seeks "plus factors" to
diagnose when parallel behavior is more than the workings of a competitive
market, and thus when agreement to fix prices can be implied.' 55 A highly
regarded opinion of Judge Posner specifies the general factors in a legal inquiry
in the absence of solid evidence of agreement:
The economic evidence will in turn generally be of two types, and is in this case:
evidence that the structure of the market was such as to make secret price fixing
feasible (almost any market can be cartelized if the law permits sellers to establish
formal, overt mechanisms for colluding, such as exclusive sales agencies); and evidence that the market behaved in a noncompetitive manner.156
Among these indicia of market structure and the capacity to cooperate are
evidence of contact, market power, and barriers to entry. 157 Market power generally "exists in degrees. Power is small when more than a slight increase in
price would lead to an unacceptable loss of sales. It is large when a firm can
profit by raising prices substantially without losing too many sales."' 5 8 The
market power, in order to be persistent, requires "some protection against a
rival's entry or expansion that would erode such supra-competitive prices and
profits."' 59 Without going into excessive detail on these theoretical questions,
it is worth taking a quick glance at whether the asbestos plaintiffs' lawyer service market has features conducive to price fixing.
First, the market for asbestos claims, unlike the broader market for legal
services, has a relatively small number of significant providers. Ten firms have
filed an enormous percentage of the total asbestos claims. 160 Market share for
the top ten firns has varied, but peaked in 1996 at 76% of all claims filed, and
has subsequently declined. 1 6 ' The downward trajectory of market share from
that point could be indicative of new entrants, which would be expected if
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW
§ 14.03, at 14-17 (3d ed. 2004).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 560-61 (1898).
154 It must be said, however, that the threshold for an inferential proof of agreement is quite
low. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
155 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89
MINN. L. REV. 9, 24 (2004).
152 PHILIP

156

In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002).
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& HOVENKAMP, supra note 152, § 5.01, at 5-5.
Id. at 5-6.
160 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 24.
161 Id.; see also Silver, supra note 15, at 2102 ("On the plaintiffs' side, a small number of
law firms control large blocks of claims, which they group for trial preparation and
settlement.").
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cartel rents were available. In fact, quick decline in market share is another
indicator of the existence and use of market power.16 The use of market
power to secure supra-competitive returns induces investment in market entry;
theory suggests that the aggregate rents correspond to the amount of investment
outsiders will make to compete against the cartel. The size of barriers to such
entry determines the ability of the cartel to survive over the long term. Since
we do not have data as to what has occurred since the completion of the RAND
study, it is unclear whether the decrease in market concentration resulted in a
decrease in prices. If the answer is yes, that would be a powerful inferential
argument that the market was cartelized during the period where prices
remained stable. Furthermore, this theory does not require a perfect cartel to
predict the astonishing price stability in the asbestos plaintiffs' market. An
imperfect cartel could complement the theories described above, with each theory taking pressure off of the other. The cartel explanation could actually fill in
for the other theories and help to predict a lag in price changes when effective
procedural reforms were implemented.
The Department of Justice has published some rules of thumb about how
to discover price collusion. One is that "[p]rice increases do not appear to be
supported by increased costs." 1 63 Similarly, one might infer agreement from a
failure to decrease prices when those costs appear to be falling; this is simply
the logical converse. Depending on what one makes of the first theory, that
costs are static because the procedural reforms have been ineffective, one is
more or less likely to find that costs are declining. If costs are in fact declining,
though, conspiracy becomes a tempting possibility.
Since one key to an inferential proof of price collusion is to demonstrate a
barrier to entry in the relevant market; there are several candidates in the asbestos context. Barriers to entry need not be erected by the suspected parties;
rather they can inhere in the nature of the market itself. High startup costs are
one example - they form the backbone of a "natural monopoly."'' 64 Asbestos
litigation arguably imposes such barriers. Asbestos practice is no place for
amateurs. The incredible complexity of doctrine, and the custom-made procedure and substance bedevil the generalist trying to practice in the field. Relationships between plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants presumably take
significant investment and cannot be instantly replicated. It is therefore plausible to think that barriers prevent ready entry into the asbestos field. One commentator, Susan Koniak, has pointed to the use of such relationships to keep up
fees. In negotiating the Georgine settlement, later rejected by the Supreme
Court, payouts were set in part on the basis of an "identity" factor. Payouts
were higher to plaintiffs' whose attorneys had previously settled large number
of cases with the CCR. That meant that going forward, plaintiffs would be
disadvantaged if they hired lawyers without such experience. Thus, the preexIn re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 660 (7th Cir. 2002)
(suggesting that a decline in market share could indicate cheating by a member of the cartel).
162
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defendants was
isting relationship between the largest plaintiffs' firms and
165
leveraged into a competitive disadvantage for other firms.
A price agreement is only credible if the hypothecated conspirators have
contact with each other or have some other plausible coordination mechanism,
that is, if the market structure is conducive to cooperation.' 66 In a sufficiently
small or close-knit market, "effective tacit price coordination might well be
expected in a market with [few] firms selling a homogeneous product in repetitive transactions."' 16 1 Given the secrecy of most lawyers' fees when cases are
settled, there does not appear to be any method to use tacit coordination; an
agreement seems necessary. However, in some cases, mere exchange of price
information is enough. "[W]hen competitors exchange price information with
each other, that alone is sufficient to establish the existence of an agreement." ' 68 Certainly at this mature point in the asbestos litigation lifespan, the
asbestos plaintiffs' lawyer product is homogenous in the extreme, which means
that a conspirator defecting by lowering prices could not hide the change
behind additional product features. This feature of the market could assist
potential conspirators in monitoring cooperation; the market would likely experience ripples if one of the large law firms changed its fee structure.
The antitrust cases impose a very low requirement to show the necessary
agreement.' 69 The most likely reason is that outsiders to the market cannot
identify the agreement unless rather attenuated proofs are allowed. Whatever
contact is visible to the outside is therefore held to suggest much broader contacts as part of the conspiracy. In the asbestos context, contact happens regularly and under conditions that are likely to facilitate the exchange of price
information. Contact among plaintiffs' lawyers not only occurs, but is necessary to facilitate various cooperative functions required by the legal system,
such as settlement negotiations. Another example is the plaintiffs' committees
necessary for any large-scale aggregated tort claim. Repeated contacts, where
conspirators can inflict punishment for defection or exchange information, are
particularly valuable to pricing agreements.' 70 Since any firm with a large
enough block of plaintiffs can prevent joint action on consolidation, pretrial
motions, settlement, and so on, each of the ten large asbestos firms has leverage
on the others. A leading lawyer has written of cooperative behavior by the
asbestos plaintiffs' bar in the context of bankruptcy settlement negotiations:
"[i]nstead, plaintiffs' attorneys agreed among themselves to cease new case

"The 'identity factor' makes entry into the asbestos-lawyering market difficult and, thus,
tends to keep fees up to the twenty-five percent ceiling the settlement sets." Koniak, supra
note 138, at 1109.
166 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939).
167 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 152, § 14.08(b), at 14-28.
168 Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Ass'n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1030 (5th Cir. 1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Int'l Woodworkers of
Am. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986)).
169 Interstate Circuit, Inc., 306 U.S. at 225.
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filings. This voluntary injunction against new cases did not prevent
pending
17 1
cases from proceeding to judgment and did not stay appeals."'
Though the top ten law firms do not control anything like one hundred
percent of the market,172 they are in a uniquely powerful position to enforce
cartel pricing. First, they are in many cases responsible for coordinated action,
such as the settlement of large, mega-joinder cases or gathering votes for bankruptcy trusts. Second, the enormous cross-referral business generates repeated
interactions. Repeated interactions are important to a conspiracy when it is not
thought that the punishments available in a one-shot game are sufficient to
enforce the cooperative outcome.
The structure of the market suggests the ability of the large firms to discipline those who deviate from cartel pricing. Control over the large settlements,
leadership of plaintiffs' committees, and so on, allows the biggest firms unusual control over allocations of fee dollars. As Stigler wrote in a keystone
article, the ability to punish deviations is an essential component of collusive
pricing. 17 In large settlements, the main firms, if they represent all claimants
in the negotiations, must be on board. The possibility to exert leverage on other
firms, then, is significant. The terms of settlements, as Koniak has pointed out,
are decided in secret. In the case she documents, the main plaintiffs' lawyers
used the settlement of futures claims to get preferential treatment for their own
inventories. Since they had the ability to get differential treatment of various
claimants, they certainly had the power to punish firms not conforming with the
agreement. 174
Of course, to suggest that the entire plaintiffs' bar engages in price collusion is "beyond the pale,"' 175 but that is not to say that collusion in certain legal
markets is impossible or even unlikely. 176 Rather, various legal markets should
be treated the same as any other market with the same basic features. A mysterious stability in prices over a long period of time, when comparable prices
(say, defense costs) are falling is reason for suspicion at the very least. Judge
Posner used similar analysis in allowing a horizontal price-fixing case to go to
summary judgment. In that case, involving the market for high-fructose corn
syrup, there was a mysterious stability in the market share of the alleged conspirators, despite a significant increase in the demand for corn syrup, for sweetened soft drinks and the like. Mysterious stability in the composition 1of
the
77
market, given those changes, was circumstantial evidence of collusion.
171 Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of
Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405,
449 (1999).
172 CARROLL ET AL.,

supra note 3, at 24.

1' Stigler, supra note 170, at 46.
17' Koniak, supra note 138, at 1051-52.
171 Silver, supra note 15, at 2091.
176 Indeed, one author believes that there is just such a system of collusion in contingencyfee billing rates. See generally Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee
Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653 (2003).
177 "Second and much more important, the output of HFCS grew during this period and one
might expect that growth to have brought about changes in market shares; for it would be
unlikely that all the sellers had the same ability to exploit the new sales opportunities opened
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None of this is to say that wholesale price collusion is happening, only
that the conditions for it to take place arguably exist. Good counterarguments
also exist, of course. The primary is that the confidential nature of most agreements between clients and their attorneys makes cartel behavior difficult,
because it is difficult to punish defection from the cartel policies. All the levers
in the world are ineffective when it is unknown against whom to apply them. A
deeper inquiry into the conditions of contact among the asbestos plaintiffs' bar
is needed.
This analysis pushes toward a broader concern about competition among
attorneys. The cooperation among litigants essential in the legal system may
end up increasing prices and harming litigant welfare. Repeated interactions, in
addition to their benign effects on reputation and expertise of the participants,
can also permit broad sharing of information, and the repeated interactions
needed to inflict punishment on cartel detractors. Not all areas of law create
these worries; repetitious, aggregated tort claims raise eyebrows highest, since
those provide the most occasions for competitors to cooperate. Despite concerns, a full evaluation of the third theory awaits further study. Because the
terms of settlements are secret, it is very hard to get a bead on collusive behavior. The RAND study was unique in using confidential information to get a
small snapshot of the litigation picture. Without that confidential information,
we could not confidently say what the transactions costs of the asbestos morass
are. Similarly intrepid work can produce the results needed to more fully evaluate the theoretical explanations here.
Are there benign explanations for fee stability, even when costs fall? One
thought is that contingency fees are not actually related to the attorneys' costs,
conventionally understood. Rather, they are a contractual mechanism to prevent attorneys from shirking in a market where effective performance is
extremely difficult to monitor. Reducing the contingency fee below the market
level would actually result in a worse product for plaintiffs because they would
not be assured that their attorneys, who have full control over the litigation and
private information about the likely results and their own efforts, would work
as hard. By paying the attorney more, clients effectively create an efficiency
wage for the attorney; knowing that she could not get the same deal elsewhere,
the attorney must work especially hard to satisfy the client. Defense lawyers
might not need this kind of arrangement because asbestos defendants are more
sophisticated and thus better able to monitor their lawyers. Such a position
argues plaintiffs' lawyers, though operating in a competitive market, do not and
cannot compete on price, but rather compete along various other axes. Expertise, reputation, and communication with clients are viable possibilities.
I do not take such claims seriously, because in most markets with monitoring problems, sufficient mechanisms exist to police shirking without dissolving
price competition. Reputation, licensing, codes of ethics, and judicial supervision should all act together to allow clients to trust their lawyers without having
to pay an outlandish fee to appropriately align the lawyers and clients'
incentives.
by the growing demand." In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651,
660 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Contingency fees in general are often justified by the risk that a plaintiffs'
lawyer undertakes in financing an action that may or may not succeed. However, the justification for some contingency fee does not argue against competition on the basis of fees in general. Some firms can generate economies of
scale, or economies in labor and material inputs brought about by experience;
over time, costs should be competed down to marginal cost. If the courts
reduce the number of hours required to recover on a claim, the lawyer's risky
outlay is reduced, and so compensation for risk should decrease as well.
In sum, no prima facie valid reason appears that would prevent plaintiffs'
attorneys from competing on price. Stable prices in the face of radical change
require explanation. Because of the structure of the market, collusion cannot be
ruled out as a possibility. Antitrust law gives limited leverage on the question,
but the factors identified by that body of law might pertain here.
The three theories described in this Article must be tested. The difficulty
of doing so from an armchair illustrates the importance of empirical studies of
the asbestos phenomenon. The crucial piece of information is whether litigation costs have been declining. If so, then the third theory becomes most plausible, because in a normal market, those declines in cost would, contrary to
what RAND found, be passed on to plaintiffs. There are no nationwide studies
of when asbestos cases get settled during the course of litigation. To say that
causation standards require extensive factual proof is to say that settlement is
unlikely until deep into discovery, the most expensive part of civil litigation.
Do asbestos cases tend to settle at that point? The necessary empirics are
unavailable. If the results ultimately prove that asbestos cases are litigated
through discovery, the settlement models discussed above translate that fact
into implications for settlement and plaintiffs fees. The models of defendant
risk preference and the weakness of asbestos causation doctrine predict such
late settlement, but must be proved empirically.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY SETTLEMENT

Regardless of which explanation or combination is chosen, the failure of
civil justice reform to decrease costs has powerful implications for prepackaged
bankruptcies and channeling trusts. These trusts, established under Section
524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code,' 78 permit the debtor/defendant to set aside certain assets, which go into a trust for distribution to current and future tort claimants. In a prepackaged bankruptcy, the claimants (through their attorneys) and
the debtor in bankruptcy, agree to the terms of the bankruptcy prior to filing
before the bankruptcy court. Plaintiffs' lawyers, the real agency behind the
plaintiff side in negotiations, should agree to the bankruptcy only if it is preferable to their alternatives, in this case the civil justice system. As the RAND
study revealed, the alternative to settlement through bankruptcy is pretty good
- a continued flow of 35% of the proceeds of asbestos litigation.' 7 9 Settling for
fees of 25%, the Manville Trust figure,18 0 only makes sense if it is 25% of a
bigger pot, specifically about 40% bigger in present value terms. Anecdotal
178

11 U.S.C. § 524(g).

179 CARROLL ET AL., supra note 3, at 105.
180

Id. at 97.
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evidence suggests that plaintiffs' attorneys think in precisely this fashion:
"[s]ome defense counsel suggested that the plaintiffs' lawyers were just as anxious to settle before class certification because the judge would be able to
adjust and monitor attorneys' fees once a class action was certified. The preservation of plaintiffs' attorneys' contingent fee contracts therefore became, sub
rosa, a negotiating element.""' l This should not be surprising. Within ethical
duties or other constraints, the plaintiffs' bar is a collection of profit-maximizing institution, and of course weighs opportunities against the status quo.
The plaintiffs' bar likely prefers aggregate settlement to litigation, but not
at any price. The impetus for aggregate settlement is the same as regular settlement: the joint costs that would have been incurred otherwise can be divided
up to settle the claims. As we have seen before, this model takes a bilateral
perspective. In truth, asbestos litigation is bilateral, not between defendants
and plaintiffs, but between defendants and plaintiffs' attorneys. The large number of cases means that plaintiffs do not and cannot exert real control over the
course of their litigation. The very notion of an "inventory" is sufficient proof.
Plaintiffs' lawyers own the litigation; they are the storekeepers. As a first cut,
then, the agreement and cooperation of plaintiffs' attorneys is necessary to the
creation of a bankruptcy trust. A feature of the system, however, is that some
parties are not represented; future claimants, who may not have even developed
symptoms, do not participate in the bankruptcy. When settlements are effected
on a mass basis, the law's traditional aggregation of a lawyer and client into a
"party" breaks down.182 The unity of interest generally assumed cannot be
enforced by client monitoring. Nor is the opposing party - the defendant likely to do much monitoring on the plaintiffs behalf. Rather, the defendant is
likely to exploit the disjuncture of client and attorney to get a better deal, taking
from the client to give to the attorney. Thus, plaintiffs' lawyers are expected to
pursue their own interests in these negotiations.
How can the bankruptcy system compensate plaintiffs' lawyers for their
opportunity costs? Scholars have suggested that the bankruptcy process is
inherently inhospitable to future claimants, 1 83 who must have their rights protected by a representative appointed by the settling parties. Because those parties are unrepresented, and must rely on the courts and other parties to represent
them, conflicts arise, indeed the same conflicts that torpedoed the settlement in
Amchem Products v. Windsor.'84 The bankruptcy settlement is attractive to the
plaintiffs' lawyers involved, then, because it shifts to their clients payments that
would have occurred in the future and to non-clients. Because their clients'
recovery is augmented by improper takings from the futures claimants, the 25%
fee becomes attractive to litigants. Though money from the futures is most
likely to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys for their lost fees, side payments are
181 Mullenix, supra note 85, at 555-56.
112 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 7, 8 (specifying the requirements for pleadings in federal
courts). The use of the term "party" in describing the character of filings clearly indicates
that both the attorney and the client are unified for the purposes of litigation.
183 See Listokin & Ayotte, supra note 115, at 1435; Richard C. Worf, A Market-Based

Approach to Protecting Future Claimants in PrepackagedMass Tort Bankruptcies 3 (Aug.

25, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
184 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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also possible. Joseph Rice, a prominent asbestos plaintiffs' attorney, received185a
$20 million dollar "success" award after participating in one bankruptcy.
The ethics of such a payment may be disputed, but certainly a plausible inference is that such a payment was in part compensation for a reduced fee on his
inventory of cases going forward.18 6 Moreover, at least one inventory settlement was reached evidently in quid pro quo for a mass settlement of futures
claims.' 8 7 This might be regarded as a side payment to attorneys. Such payments are necessary to explain why lawyers would agree to lower fees in mass
settlements, when the litigation system gives them the same fees for the foreseeable future.
The stability of fees induced by litigation drives the inference of ill-doing
in the bankruptcy process. If fees were likely to decline in the future because
of procedural reform, the reduced fees in the bankruptcy settlements would
make sense. The fee is just the discounted value of the future (declining) fees.
But since the fees are not likely to decline, the willingness of plaintiffs' attorneys to accept less in bankruptcy can only reflect an improperly enlarged pot
from which those smaller percentages are taken. The theoretical explanations
of the failure of asbestos reforms therefore create serious doubt as to whether
the prepackaged bankruptcy fairly treats future claimants.
CONCLUSION

Though mass bankruptcies may spell the end of judicial resolution of
claims against manufacturers, the current approach to secondary or tertiary theories of liability predicts a continued flood of asbestos claims. The dynamics
described in this Article will likely continue indefinitely until plaintiffs'
increasingly attenuated substantive theories of liability fail. Whether the reason
for the failure of procedural reform is cartel behavior by plaintiffs' attorneys, or
substantive vagueness in the law of causation, or risky insolvency-driven
behavior by defendants, the system seems structured to continue paying enormous fees to attorneys. To solve the problem is to make the litigation system
resemble more closely the accelerated claims processes of the bankruptcy trusts
and the administrative mechanisms suggested in congressional asbestos legislation. 188 Causation should be proved on the background of clear rules. Exposure, likewise.
What cannot be defended is procedural reform for its own sake. The economic model of settlement predicts that many procedural reforms will have
unintended consequences, as they increase the amount of litigation and tend to
re-equilibrate the system without significant cost savings. Reform of the asbestos mess requires reevaluating the expansion of liability and the nebulous stan185

See Jonathan D. Glater, Asbestos Bankruptcies Face Setbacks on Two Fronts, N.Y.

TIMES,

June 4, 2004, at C3.

186 See Koniak, supra note 138, at 1054-55.

See id. at 1052.
See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, S. 852, 109th Cong.
(establishing trust fund for asbestos claimants, disbursed in relatively simple administrative
scheme). See also Black Lung Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972) (adopting evidence presumptions and capped liability for miners with black lung disease).
187
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dards that have made asbestos claims so attractive to attorneys in the first place.
Moreover, prepackaged bankruptcies should be carefully examined, for what
appears to be saved in transaction costs might be repaid in a loss of fairness to
future claimants and other outsiders to the negotiations that produce these
mechanisms. If the bankruptcy system cannot yield the low-cost, equitable
results promised, Congress must act to set up a system that is cheaper than the
civil justice system, without giving the plaintiffs' bar power to manipulate the
results.

